

Hydro Tasmania

FCAS presentation to OTTER

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Commercial in confidence slides have been removed

Hydro Tasmania's proposal

Hydro Tasmania proposes the following approach:

- Not regulating the physical raise contingency FCAS product.
- Approving pricing principles for raise contingency FCAS hedge products in Tasmania.
- Approving the contract terms for the regulated product.
- Providing a process of review for any participant which disagrees with a quoted price from Hydro Tasmania for raise contingency FCAS.
- Setting the period of the price determination for 3 years.

Regulation of hedge contracts

- The regulation of hedges is vastly more attractive than regulating the physical offers as they:
 - Do not interfere with the efficiency of the dispatch process.
 - Minimise the burden on both OTTER and Hydro Tasmania.
 - Deliver a product which is useful to participants in managing their FCAS risks.
 - Provide participants with medium term price signals

OTTER's criteria for assessment

Principles	Physical	Financial
Be consistent with the National Electricity Objective;	x	✓
Not be unduly onerous on Hydro Tasmania in its application;	x	🙄
Have minimal impact, if any, on the wider National Electricity Market; and	x	✓
Not require an amendment to the National Electricity Rules nor add complexity to the National Electricity Market dispatch process.	🙄	✓
Be fair and reasonable;	x	✓
Enable Hydro Tasmania to recover its costs for the efficient provision of the declared electrical services;	x	✓
Provide market signals that promote efficiency and maximise incentives for other parties to supply raise contingency FCAS in the Tasmanian region; and	✓ (if above new entrant)	✓ (if above new entrant)
Not impose significant regulatory costs on the Regulator or Hydro Tasmania.	x	✓

Pricing principles – current methodology


- Based upon short run costs
 - HT requirement supplied from least cost supply
 - Critical inertia level met – allocated proportionally
- Key assumptions
 - R6 requirements
 - Competitor generation
 - Basslink flow
 - Hydro Tasmania efficient merit order - energy
- Cost components
 - Inertia – synchronous condenser
 - Operational inefficiencies

Current pricing policy - worked examples

Two major cost elements

- Inertia – synchronous condenser
 - Critical quantum
 - Number of start/stops of machines
 - Median Vic price
 - REC price
 - Allocation methodology – proportional to participant generation levels
- Operational inefficiencies
 - Stations impacted
 - Hours operation
 - Value of water foregone
 - Allocation methodology – sourced own liability first

Allocation methodology



Capital costs for pricing principles

- Generators often bid FCAS to achieve energy outcomes rather than recover FCAS costs, but if FCAS is regulated as a separate market this must be disregarded.
- 19 power stations enabled for FCAS raise contingency services.
- 15 machines can operate in synchronous condenser mode providing inertia contribution.
- Almost all assets for generation of energy and FCAS are common.
- Inertia uses energy generation assets.
- Raise contingency services provided concurrently with energy.

Capital costs for pricing principles (cont)

- Methodology for cost allocation unclear
 - Option 1: (lost efficient output/total efficient output)*Depreciated Replacement Cost (DRC)
 - Option 2: replace short run marginal cost (water value) with long run average cost in existing formula
- Either approach requires determination of DRC
- Hydro Tasmania's DRC asset value is large:
 - insurance value of Hydro Tasmania's assets is \$5.3 billion (depreciated)
 - compared to balance sheet value of \$4.1 billion (depreciated)
- Need to create regulatory accounts – onerous and expensive exercise

Capital costs for pricing principles (cont)

- Option 2 suggests 80% or greater increase in cost of raise contingency compared to current methodology
- Costs of regulation unknown, but likely to be disproportionately large compared to total service cost of \$4.5 million per annum on current methodology
- Capital and regulatory costs may increase cost of raise contingency services to the extent that there is no public benefit from regulation

IES Requests

- Request 1. Provided on 11 May
- Request 2.
 - Initial response provided in this presentation.
 - Has this presentation demonstrated the issues of your concern?

Summary

- Regulating hedges meets OTTER's criteria best
- Pricing policies require multiple assumptions
- FCAS costs can vary significantly
- Capital costs are very hard to incorporate
- What further information/discussions are required?



Hydro Tasmania

the renewable energy business

